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Sensitivity to configural changes in face processing has been cited as evidence for face-exclusive
mechanisms. Alternatively, general mechanisms could be fine-tuned by experience with homo-
geneous stimuli. We tested sensitivity to configural transformations for novices and experts with
nonface stimuli (“Greebles”). Parts of transformed Greebles were identified via forced-choice
recognition. Regardless of expertise level, the recognition of parts in the Studied configuration was
better than in isolation, suggesting an object advantage. For experts, recognizing Greeble parts in a
Transformed configuration was slower than in the Studied configuration, but only at upright. Thus,
expertise with visually similar objects, not faces per se, may produce configural sensitivity. @ 1997
Elsevier Science Ltd.
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INTRODUCTION
Several researchers have proposed that configural infor-
mation, that is, the relations between parts, is especially
important in the way faces are visually represented
(Diamond & Carey, 1986; Farah, 1990; Rhodes 1988;
Sergent, 1988). If this is the case, face processing, as
compared to the processingof nonface objects, shouldbe
particularly disrupted by changes in the configurationof
parts. Tanaka and colleagues tested this hypothesis by
examiningwhether configuraltransformationsinfluenced
the recognition of individual features (Tanaka & Farah,
1993;Tanaka & Sengco, 1996).In severalstudiesTanaka
tested the forced-choicerecognitionof individualparts of
faces (e.g. “Jim’s nose”) or control stimuli (houses,
inverted faces, or scrambled faces). For each stimulus
class three conditionswere used:
1. Parts in isolation (e.g. Jim’s nose alone);
2. Parts in the context of the studied object with some
transformation in configuration (e.g. Jim’s nose in
Jim’s face with the eyes moved slightly apart);
3. Parts in the context of the studied object (e.g. Jim’s
nose in Jim’s face).
Crucially, the target and distracter parts were exactly
the same in all three conditionsand within each condition
the context for both the target and distracter parts was
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identical. Thus, if subjects are using independent part
representations, there should be no difference in the
diagnostic information available between the three
conditions.Nonetheless,parts of faces were most readily
recognized in the Studied configuration,less readily in a
Transformed configuration,and most poorly in isolation,
suggesting that the parts of faces are not represented
independently (a so-called “holistic representation”). In
contrast, none of the tests with control stimuli—
scrambled faces, inverted faces, or houses—revealed
any advantage for recognizing parts embedded in the
intact configurationof the studied object.
Whenever a particular effect, such as that just
described, is obtained with faces and not control stimuli,
the question arises as to whether this implicates a face-
specificmechanism.From our perspectiveit is prudent to
consider specialized mechanisms only after the best
possible control conditions have failed to replicate a
given effect. In the case of faces, this means using non-
face stimulithat adequatelymatch many of the visual and
categorical constraintsfound for faces. For instance, one
of the most famousphenomenaassociatedwith faces, the
inversioneffect, in which there is a disproportionatecost
for recognizing inverted faces (Farah et al., 1995; Yin,
1969), has been obtained with a homogeneous set of
nonface objects (dogs of the same breed), but only for
expert participants(Diamond & Carey, 1986).Similarly,
Rhodes and McLean (1990) obtained the caricature
advantage, that is, caricaturesof faces are recognized
more quickly than the actual faces, with bird expertswho
identified members of a highly homogeneous class of
birds. Such demonstrations,however, do not necessarily
rule out face-specific mechanisms in all phenomena
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FIGURE1. Meet the Greebles.Samuleobjectschosenfrom a set of 60 control stimuli for faces. Each obiect can be categorized
at the Greeble, family, gender, and individual levels. The Greebles were created by Scott Yu using Alias Sketch! three-
dimensionalmodelingsoftware.
associated with face recognition—itis certainly possible
that some of the effects which are considered to be face
specificare mediatedby a specialmechanism.Therefore,
each putative face-specificphenomenonshouldbe tested
using experimental conditions that are matched as
carefully as possible, including specifically, equivalent
levels of visual homogeneity,categorical level of recog-
nition, and degree of expertise.
One of the most salient characteristicsof face recog-
nition is that faces have similar features organized in
similar configurations. Therefore, an adequate set of
control stimuli should share this constraint. For this
reason, sets of exemplars from a single visually homo-
geneous category such as species of birds or breeds of
dogshave been used as control stimuli.However, it is not
only the homogeneity of the subset of objects actually
used in the experiment that matters—forfamiliar classes
of objects, the space of all known exemplars is also
crucial. Thus, the apparent homogeneityof a control set
may be insufficientif the larger class is not homogeneous
[as in the case of houses or landscapes, Diamond and
Carey (1986)].
A secondcharacteristicof face recognitionis that faces
are typically recognized at the exemplar-specificlevel.
Thus, while we often recognize most objects at the basic
level [e.g. “chair or dog”, see Rosch et al. (1976)], faces
are generally recognizedat the most extreme subordinate
level (e.g. “Jim or Max”). Consequently, it is important
that control tasks addressingface-specificeffects require
the recognitionof control stimuli at the subordinatelevel
(e.g. distinguishing between several dogs of the same
breed).
A third characteristic of face recognition is that
humans are highly expert at the very difficult task of.
discriminating between-individual faces. Although ex-
pertise is difficultto define,it seemsclear thatit shouldbe
more than simply a practice effect in which performance
improves with experience. One empirical definitionthat
has been used and which we will adopt here is a
qualitative shift in processing.Tanaka and Taylor (1991)
found such a shift for bird experts who were as fast to
recognize objects at the subordinate level (“robin”) as
they were at the basic level (“bird”). In contrast, non-
experts are consistentlyfaster on basic-level discrimina-
tions as compared to subordinate-leveldiscriminations.
Similarly,becausehumansare face experts,judgmentsof
face identity (subordinatelevel) are as fast as judgments
that are more categorical, for instance gender (Tanaka,
personal communication). Therefore, because expertise
interacts with the level of categorization, it is important
that control tasks addressing face-specific effects use
stimuli for which the participants are experts.
Based on such criteria, studies that have used bird or
dog recognition by experts appear to have adequately
matched control tasks to face recognition (Diamond &
Carey, 1986; Rhodes & McLean, 1990). Indeed, these
studies have found evidence for nominally face-specific
effects with nonface stimuli. However, there are three
limitationsto using such controls. First, from a practical
standpoint, experts within a given domain may be
difficultto recruit. Second, from a theoretical standpoint,
extant experts are already trained and, as such, do not
provide the experimenter with any opportunity to
manipulate the origin or the level of expertise. Third,
from an empirical standpoint,several researchers (Carey
& Diamond, 1994;Diamond & Carey, 1986;Johnson &
Morton, 1991)have emphasized that the inversioneffect
in dogjudges requires 10 yr of experiencewith a specific
breed, which is also the time it takes for children to
perform in the normal adult range on face encoding tasks
(Carey & Diamond, 1994). This long onset to attain
expertisesuggeststhat a comparablelevel of competence
may not be obtainable in the time-course of an experi-
ment (or at least one we would wish to run). The study
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presented here addresses these limitationsby attempting
to create experts for the subordinate-levelrecognitionof
a homogeneousset of nonface stimuli (“Greebles”; Fig.
1). In particular, we examine whether, given extensive
experience with some Greebles, participants exhibit
sensitivity to configural information with unfamiliar
Greebles. If indeed experts can be created in the
laboratory, this would provide a tool for the investigation
of face recognitionand, more generally,visual expertise.
In the present study we chose to investigate the
nominally face-specific sensitivity to changes in config-
uration(Tanaka & Farah, 1993;Tanaka& Sengco,1996).
In prior studies, control stimuli for faces were houses,
inverted faces, or scrambled faces. Given possible
nonequivalence between these sets and normal faces,
we used stimuli specificallyconstrained to be similar to
faces along several dimensions,Greebles, as our control
set. Moreover, we manipulated the level of expertise, so
that thisvariablewas not confoundedwith stimulusclass.
As discussedearlier, the stimulustransformationsused in
Tanaka and colleagues’experimentswere independentof
the information required to perform the forced-choice
recognitionjudgment. This same manipulationwas used
here to assess sensitivity to configural transformations.
Therefore, if the parts of each Greeble are encoded
independently,then the patternsof performanceobserved
for the Isolated-parts, the Transformed-configuration,
and the Studied-configurationconditionsare predicted to
be equivalent. On the other hand, if the parts of each
Greeble are encoded in a configuralmanner, that is, the
positions of individual parts are dependent on one
another, then performance is predicted to be best in the
Studied-configuration condition, poorer in the Trans-
formed-configurationand the Isolated-parts conditions.
Crucially, this pattern is expected to be more pronounced
for experts than novices. Moreover, an interaction of
expertisewith orientationis expected, that is, for experts,
the recognition of parts in upright Greebles should be
more sensitive to configural transformations than the
recognitionof parts in inverted Greebles.
METHODS
Participants
Thirty-two undergraduatesat Yale University partici-
pated in the experimentin return for course credit and/or
payment.
Design and materials
Sixty photorealistically rendered three-dimensional
objects (Greebles) were generated with Alias Sketch!
(Alias Research Inc., Toronto) on an Apple Macintosh.
All Greebles have four protruding parts organized in
approximately the same spatial configuration on a
vertically oriented central part. The set is organized
orthogonallyalong two categoricaldimensions,such that
each Greeble is a member of one of two “genders” and
one of five “families”(Fig. 1). There are five central part
shapeseach definingone of the five families.The gender
difference is defined by the orientation of the parts
relative to the central part, either all pointing upward or
downward.Althoughsomeof the parts are very similar to
each other, every individualpart is uniquewithin the set.
From this set, 30 Greebles(three individualsfrom each
genderx family combination)were used during expertise
training, while 24 unfamiliar Greebles (12 of each
gender) were used in the novice-leveland the expertise-
level test phases. Nonsensewords were used as names to
designate the three kinds of parts, the two genders, the
five families, and each individual. For purposes of
expertise training, 10 Greebles (five of each gender)
were given individual names. For the novice-level and
the expertise-leveltest phases, four sets (“Plokl, Plok2,
Glipl, Glip2”) of six Greebles within the same gender
categorywere crossedwith four sets (“A, B, C, D“) of six
novel names to produce four testingconditions:PloklA–
TABLE 1. Testing and training procedurefor novices and experts at Greeble recognition
Number of trials Novices Experts
Learn generic names of Greeble parts and specific names for six upright Greebles 36 Q
Recognitionof parts in upright Greebles in the Studied,Transformed,and Isolated conditions 54 @
Learn to associate specific names with six new inverted Greebles 36 @
Recognitionof parts in inverted Greebles in the Studied,Transformed,and Isolated conditions 54 Q
Examples of the three levels of categorization 75 @
Learn the names of first five individualsandblocksof 60 trials of a yes/nocategorizationparadigmfor
each level of categorization (gender, family, individual) 720 @
Learn the names of five more individualsand blocks of 60 trials of a yes/no categorizationparadigm
for each level of categorization (gender, family, individual) 360 8
Training cycle
Blocks of trials at the individual level 180 @
Blocks with the three levels randomized(yes/no categorizationtask) 360 @
Until performance on the individual level is indistinguishable from one of the other two levels
Learn generic names of Greeble parts and specific names for six new upright Greebles 36 8
Recognitionof parts in upright Greebles in the Studied,Transformed,and Isolated conditions 54 Q
Learri to associate specific names with six new inverted Greebles 36 @
Recognitionof parts in inverted Greebles in the Studied,Transformed,and Isolated conditions 54 @
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FIGURE 2. (a) Novel names assigned to the Greeble parts. (b)
Example of the forced-choice recognition paradigm used to test
novices and experts. Participantswere showna single Greebleat study
and then were tested with pairs of imagesshowinga part of the studied
Greeble and a distracter part. Parts appearedin isolation,in the Studied
configuration,or a Transformedconfigurationand participantsjudged
whether the left or right image contained the specified part from
the studied Greeble. Arrows indicate the stimulus changes in the
Transformed configuration. Note that while the 15 deg rotation of
the top parts is quite subtle, experts (but not novices) report noticing
this change.
GliplB, Plok2C–Glip2D;GliplD–PloklC; Glip2B-Plo-
k2A. There were four experts and four novices tested for
recognition of parts of Greebles in each of these four
possibleorders (for a total of 16 experts and 16 novices).
For each of the 24 unfamiliar Greebles used in the test
phases, two versions were generated, one with the top
pair of parts in its original position and one with each of
these two parts moved 15 deg around the vertical axis
towards the front. Three distracterswere created for each
of these two versions,with one of the three kindsof parts
replaced in each distracter by a foil part (drawn from
within the same subset of six objects). Finally, three
images were also created for each target, showing each
target and foil part in isolation.
The experimentwas performedon an Apple Macintosh
LC 475 equippedwith a SonyTrinitron 13”colormonitor
with a resolutionof 640 x 480 pixels (72 pixelsper inch).
The Greebles were all the same purple shade, with an
overhead light and a stippled texture. Images were about
6.5 x 6.5 cm and presented in the middleof the screen on
a white background. Participants sat about 60 cm from
the screen, yielding a display area subtending approxi-
mately 6.2 deg x 6.2 deg of visual angle.
Procedure
The experimentconsisted of three phases:
1. Testing of sensitivity to configural changes in
novices;
2. Expertise training; and
3. Testing of sensitivity to configural changes in
experts.
See Table 1 for a detailed description of the training
and testing procedure. We now review the procedures
used for novices and experts.
Participants who served as novices first learned the
names of the three kindsof Greebleparts [fromthe top to
thebottomof an object,boges,quifi dunth, Fig. 2(a)]. No
further training was given. Participantswere then tested
for forced-choice recognition of parts with upright and
inverted Greebles [Fig. 2(b)]. For each of the two
orientations, the names of six different Greebles were
learned. Each name was shown for 1 sec in the middle of
the screen followed by a Greeble that the participant
could view for as long as desired. Six Greebles were
studiedin thisway six timeseach, in a randomorder for a
total of 36 learning trials. Following this, forced-choice
recognition of the parts was assessed. On each trial, a
promptwas shown on the screen specifyingone part of a
particular target (e.g. “PIMO’S BOGES”) followed by
two pictures side-by-side on the screen. Participants
selected whether the right or left image contained the
designatedpart by pressing one of two keys. There were
three conditionsrandomized together:
1. Studied-configuration:the two choices were the
specifiedpart and a foil part, both in the context of
the Greeble specifiedin the prompt;
2. Transformed-configuration:the two choiceswere of
the specifiedpart and a foil part, both in the context
of the Greeble specified in the prompt but with the
top parts moved 15 deg towards the front;
3. Isolated-part:the two choices were of the specified
part and a foil part, both in isolation on the screen.
Following this testing with upright Greebles, six
differentGreebleswere learned in an invertedorientation
and the recognition of their parts was assessed with the
Studied-configuration, Transformed-configuration, and
Isolated-partconditionsusing inverted Greebles.
Participants who served as experts first went through
extensive training to make them “experts” at Greeble
recognition.They practiced recognizing 30 Greebles at
three levels of categorization: the gender; family; and
individuallevels. Each of the 30 Greebles had a visually
definedgender and family category while only ten of the
objectswere given individualnames (the otherswere part
of a “none-of-the-above” category at the individual
level). Each category was taught to participants by
showinga seriesof examplesfrom that categoryfollowed
by repeated blocks of 60 trials of a label-verification
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FIGURE3. Expertisetraining.Exampleof the progressionof responsetimes for recognizingGreeblesat the gender,family, and
individual levels with increasing expertise. Data are shownfor one participant because participantsreached the criterion after
different numbers of training sessions (see text for details regardingthe criterion).
TABLE2. Responsetimes (msec) andpercentcorrect for the recognitionof the three types of parts for upright
and inverted Greebles by novices and experts
Top parts Middle part Bottompart Mean
1677
Upright Greebles
Novices
Transformed 2845/89 4255/79 3581/71 3560/80
Studied 3341/86 4354/7’1 3863/68 3853/76
Isolated parts 2835/78 3671/61 2262/72 2923/70
Experts
Transformed 2382/88 2855/85 2609/80 2695/86
Studied 2257/93 2472/90 2038/82 2306/87
Isolated parts 1670/87 2319/73 2125/73 1991/76
Inverted Greebles
Novices
Transformed 2278177 3331/75 3148/77 2919/76
Studied 2632183 4024/77 2733180 3129/80
Isolated parts 2270/82 2145/71 2286/80 2234/78
Experts
Transformed 1572/93 2394/90 1896/83 2204/85
Studied 1969/82 2829/85 1172/83 2382/83
Isolated parts 1443/80 1974/77 1422/77 1717/79
paradigm for each level of categorization. Each label-
verificationtrial was initiatedwith a fixationcross in the
middle of the screen for 500 msec, followed by a label
shown for 1000msec designating a gender, family, or
individual.After 250 msec, a Greeble replaced the label
and it remained on the screen until the participant
responded as to whether the Greeble matched the label.
After an average of six runs at each level (60 trials per
run), there was a cycle of two types of tasks: the first
included 180 trials of practice at the individuallevel and
the second included 360 trials divided into two blocks of
180 randomized trials, with 60 trials for each of the three
levels of categorization. The first task included many
individual-level trials to provide more experience with
the most difficultlevel. In the second task, we compared
the three levels when participants could not predict the
level from one trial to the next.
To be considered experts, participants had to reach a
pre-specifiedcriterion during the mixed blocks. Compar-
isonswere made on the three levels of categorizationfor
the ten objectsfor which individualnameswere assigned.
To reach the criterion, the average response time for
individual-level recognition had to be statistically
equivalent to the response time for at least one of the
two other levels (measured by pairwise t-tests with
individualu levels of 0.05). Experts reached the criterion
after an average of 3240 trials (ranging from 2700 to
5400) spread across a total of seven to ten l-hr sessions
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FIGURE 4. Accuracy and response times for correct trials in the part-recognition test, for the Studied-configurationand
Isolated-partsconditions.Resultsare reportedfor novicesandexpertswithbothuprightand invertedGreebles.Errorbars reflect
the standard error between subjects, while the Scheff6tests are repeated measures.
(Fig. 3)*. After reachingthe criterion,expertswere tested
for the recognition of parts of 12 new Greebles (six
upright, six inverted) in the identicalprocedure in which
novices were tested (Studied,Transformed, Isolated).
RESULTS
Proportion correct and response times were analyzed
with three-way ANOVAs including two within-subject
*Note that generic experience with the stimuli was found to be
insufficientto developexpertise.The artist whocreated the Greeble
set took just as long to reach the criterion of expertise as complete
novices. This is not to say that the large amountof experiencethis
person had with the Greebles did not result in some type of expert
processing of this category, only that this knowledge did not
transfer to the part-recognitiontask. Similarly,expertisewith faces
is thoughtnot to transfer to invertedfaces (Yin, 1969;Moseset al.,
1996).
and one between-subject factors: Orientation (Upright/
Inverted)x Presentation Condition (Studied, Trans-
formed, Isolated)x Expertise (Novice/Expert). Only
response times for correct trials were analyzed and they
were submittedto a log transformationbefore analysis(to
normalize the typically skewed RT distribution). Mean
RTs for all 12 cells of the design are shown in Table 2.
The ANOVA revealed that experts were reliably faster,
F(1,30) = 8.21,P <0.01, and marginallymore accurate,
17(1,,30)= 3.65, P = 0.06, than novices; inverted Gree-
bles were responded to reliably faster, F(1,30) = 18.42,
P <0.001, but were not more accurately recognized,
F <1, than upright Greebles; presentation conditions
varied reliably from each other for both response time,
F(2,,60)= 38.84, P <0.001, and accuracy, F(2,60) =
9.07, P <0.001. The main effect of orientation on
response time may be attributed to the fact that
participants were always tested first with upright
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Greebles, and, thus may have the advantage of having
practiced the forced-choice recognition task when they
encounteredinverted Greebles.Note, however, that these
main effects do not address the crucial predictionsof this
study. Rather, these focus on the interaction analyses
specifically comparing the two changed conditions,
Isolated-parts and Transformed-configuration, to the
Studied-configurationcondition, crossed with the level
of expertise and the orientation of the stimuli. These
comparisons, all significant according to Scheff6’spost
hoc tests (P< 0.05), are presented next.
Isolated parts vs Studied configuration
As shown in Fig. 4, for novices, the Isolated-partsand
the Studied-configurationconditions were not reliably
different in terms of accuracy, but response times were
reliably faster for the Isolated-partscondition relative to
the Studied-configurationcondition,presumablybecause
there is considerablyless informationto processwhen the
parts are presented in isolation. This response-time
advantage for the Isolated-partscondition relative to the
Studied-configurationalso holds for novices with in-
verted Greebles and for experts with both upright and
inverted Greebles. Although response times were not
reported in their paper, a similar pattern was also
observed by Tanaka and Sengco (1996) for the recogni-
tion of parts of faces (J. Tanaka, personal communica-
tion).
Across both expertise level and stimulus orientation,
the response-timeadvantage for isolated parts manifests
itself as a speed–accuracy tradeoff as participants were
always faster and less accurate in the Isolated-parts
conditionrelative to the Studied-configurationcondition.
However, the cost for experts with upright Greebles
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FIGURE 5. Accuracy and response times for correct trials in the part-recognition test, for the Studied-configurationand
Transformed-configurationconditions. Results are reported for novices and experts with both upright and inverted Greebles.
Error bars reflect the standard error between subjects, while the Scheff6tests are repeated measures.
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cannot be explained by this speed–accuracy tradeoff
because the experts showed at least as large a response-
time difference between the Isolated-partsand Studied-
configurationconditions with inverted Greebles as they
showed with upright Greebles, yet the effect in accuracy
was obtained only for upright Greebles. Moreover, there
is no reliable increase in the Studied–Isolateddifference
between novices and experts. Finally, there is some hint
that the Isolated–Studieddifferencemay be in part due to
the homogeneity of the Greeble set and the subtle part
discriminationtask, rather than to the level of expertise.
In particular, although not reliable, the direction of the
Isolated-Studied difference for accuracy is the same as
for the other three groups (noviceswith both upright and
inverted Greebles and experts with inverted Greebles)
and this difference was consistent across the three types
of Greeble parts (Table 2). Interestingly,this effect could
be akin to the object-superiorityeffect obtainedby Gyoba
et al. (1980) in which a learned perceptual schema can
generate contextualexpectationsfacilitatingrecognition.
Supporting this argument, Tanaka et al. (1996) have
recently reported that children as young as 6 yr of age
remember individualparts of faces better in the context
of complete faces as compared to the same parts in
isolation. This suggests that the object advantage may
occur earlier than configural sensitivity during the
process of acquiringperceptualexpertise.In this context,
the fact that experts did not show a reliable difference
from novicesis less surprising,sincethe Isolated–Studied
contrast may test a different process than the Trans-
formed–Studiedcontrast.
Transformed configuration vs Studied configuration
As shown in Fig. 5, for novices, the Transformed-
configuration and the Studied-configurationconditions
were not reliably different in terms of either accuracy or
response times. For experts, however, response times to
upright Greebles were reliably slower in the Trans-
formed-configurationcondition relative to the Studied-
configurationcondition. Crucially, this difference repre-
sents a qualitativechange in the recognitionbehavior of
experts-in contrast, the accuracy differenceobtained in
the Isolated-Studied comparison for experts was only a
change in magnitude—thus, the preferred explanation
here is that the expertise manipulation produced the
speed advantage for the Studied-configurationcondition
over the Transformed-configurationcondition. Support-
ing this interpretation,a two-factorANOVA on log(RT)
revealed a main effect for Expertise, F(1,30) = 10.8,
P <0.005, and a near-reliable interaction between
Expertise (novice/expert) and Condition (transformed/
studied),F(1,30) = 3.85,P = 0.059.Also significantwas
the fact that the Transformed–Studied difference was
consistent across the three types of Greeble parts (Table
2).
Based on informal debriefingsfollowing testing, none
of the novices reported noticing the moved parts in the
Transformed-configurationcondition. In contrast, some
of the experts spontaneouslyreported that the top parts of
some Greebles had been moved and all of the experts
responded affirmativelywhen asked if they had noticed
the transformation.
DISCUSSION
Face processing shows disproportionate costs for
configural changes (Tanaka & Farah, 1993). Although
this “face-specific” effect has been interpreted as
evidence for a face-exclusivemechanism, we wondered
whether thispatterncouldbe explainedby a more general
recognition mechanism fine-tuned by experience with
homogeneousstimuli.We investigatedthis possibilityby
testi:ng sensitivity to configural transformations for
novices and experts with homogeneousnonface stimuli-
Greebles. Several findings stand out as relevant to the
question of face-specific recognition mechanisms. First,
our results suggest that the previously obtained object-
superiority effect for faces holds for the recognition of
parts taken from members of a visually homogeneous
nonface object class. Greeble parts, in particular, were
better recognized in the context of intact Greebles
relative to the recognitionof the same parts in isolation.
This advantagewas no differentfor experts as compared
to novices and both groups showed a similar pattern of
behavior with inverted Greebles. Thus, it seems that the
visualpropertiesof the objectsand/orthe task, rather than
the level of expertise,were responsiblefor the difference.
We also found a general response-time advantage for
isolated parts over the Studied configuration-while this
finding does not account for the accuracy difference
displayed by experts with upright Greebles, it does
suggest caution in interpreting the results of the part-
recognition paradigm in that response times are not
typically reported (Tanaka & Sengco, 1996; Tanaka &
Fara,h,1993;Tanakaet al., 1996).In contrast,Tanaka and
Fara.h(1993)did not findan object-superiorityeffect with
either inverted or scrambled faces or houses, all sets of
homogeneousobjects. Our belief is that this discrepancy
indicates an important advantage to using novel objects
as c:ontrol stimuli: inverted and scrambled faces are
“wrong” versions of an overlearned stimuli, and the
entire category of houses contains much more variation
in th~econfigurationof their features than do faces. Thus,
prior experience of participants with the more typical
instances of faces and houses could prevail over the
experimentallycreated proximal qualitiesof the stimuli,
especially if the participants are not extensively trained
on tlhemodifiedversions of the stimuli.
Second, our results suggest that the training procedure
rendleredthe expertsmore sensitiveto a subtle change in
the configurationof the parts, even when this changewas
performedon a part that they were instructedto ignore.In
particular, experts recognized Greeble parts better in the
Stuclied-configurationthan in the Transformed-con-
figuration.What is not entirely clear is why our partici-
pants showed this sensitivity in response time while
Tanaka’s participants showed it in accuracy. Of course,
psychophysical models rarely allow one to predict a
priori whether a difference between conditions will
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manifest itself in one dependent measure or the other.
Supporting our interpretation of this effect, however, is
that the expert recognition of all three types of Greeble
parts was sensitive to this transformation,in accordance
with the findings with faces. This effect of configural
informationwas not present in the novices’data, nor was
it found for experts with inverted Greebles. Thus, it
appears to represent a qualitative shift in recognition
behavior produced by the expertise training.
These results offer some insights into the recognition
patterns found for faces by Tanaka and his colleagues
(Tanaka & Farah, 1993; Tanaka & Sengco, 1996). In
particular, they obtained an advantage for the Studied
configurationof a face over both isolatedparts of the face
and a Transformed configurationof the face. Here, we
dissociated these conditionswith regard to their depen-
dence on experience and found that sensitivity to these
transformations was not specific to faces. It should be
noted that the question of whether Greeble experts’
sensitivityto configuralchangesis specificto the training
orientation should be addressed more specifically in a
design in which testing is counterbalanced across the
upright and inverted conditions.
CONCLUSIONS
The present study shows how extensive practice with
previouslynovel nonface objectscan lead to some of the
recognition effects typically associated with faces. We
found that expertise training changed novices,who were
presumably processing Greebles with their “default”
object-recognition system, into experts, who were not
only faster and more accurate but displayed a greater
sensitivityto configuralchanges. This effect of expertise
acquisition on the part-recognition paradigm can be
compared to Stroop interference (Stroop, 1935). Robust
interference is found in the Stroop task when subjects
have to name the color of incongruently colored color
terms. This interference is due to the automaticity of
reading that has been acquiredover years of practice. In a
similar fashion, the acquisitionof Greebleexpertiseleads
to interference from information that experts have
learned to process automatically. This is demonstrated
by the fact that our expertscannot ignorethismore global
information, even when it would be more efficient to do
so (e.g. in the Transformed condition). In contrast to the
Stroop effect, not much is known about the learning
process that leads to face or Greeble expertise, nor can
our experiment illuminatethe particular features that are
used by experts. The only evidence regarding this issue
stems out of studies on the features used for face
recognition, for instance Rhodes (1988) reported that
both first-order (e.g. the appearance of the parts) and
second-order features (e.g. the spatial relations between
the parts), as well as global features such as age and
*Interestingly, several recent models suggest that the perceptual
system may be tuned in a similar mannerbased on experience—in
particular, in terms of the self-organizationthat may occur in early
vision (Field, 1994;Weiss & Edelman, 1995).
weight, appear to be encoded in face representations.
While novices may rely on first-orderfeatures, expertise
acquisition may lead them to use second-order features
and even perhapshigher-orderfeatures.* The similarities
of the pattern obtained here for Greeble part-recognition
to that obtainedfor recognitionof face parts suggeststhat
Greeble experts employed mechanisms similar to those
implicated in face recognition.Assuming this to be the
case, an importantquestion is: Did training lead novices
to abruptlyswitchfrom one typeof processingto another,
or did a more continuousshift of the type of processing
occur?
Consideration of single-cell recording work with
monkeyssuggestsa speculativebut intriguingpossibility.
First, Perrett and Oram (1993) suggested that the
configural sensitivity found for some “face cells”-
temporal lobe neurons selectively activated by faces—
could be produced by a combination of inputs most
selective for complex assembled features. For example,
cells responsiveto two eyes side-by-sideor a nose above
a mouthcouldbe combinedto producea sensitivityto the
overall face configuration. Second, Tanaka (1996),
working with anesthetized monkeys, has recently in-
vestigated the minimal stimulus features necessary and
sufficient to activate individual neurons in infero-
temporal (IT) cortex. He has found that the critical
features of these cells are moderately complex (e.g. an
eight-pointstar-shapedpattern or a green square above a
red circle) and may be thought of as an “alphabet” of
features that couldbe combinedto code complexobjects.
It is possiblethat the complex features for which IT cells
appear to be selectiveare not fixedbut can be modifiedas
the result of structured experience such as expertise at
subtler levels of discrimination.Indeed, Logothetis and
Pauls (1995) have demonstrated that IT neurons can
become highly selective for previously novel stimuli. In
our experiment, expertise training may have led to the
assembly of complex feature-detectors, extracted from
the statistical properties of the Greeble set that proved
useful for performing the training discriminations (for
example, the orientation of the Boges is diagnostic for
distinguishingbetween the two genders). Such a system
could presumably make use of the recurrent spatial
configurationacrossthe set and of the probabilitiesof co-
occurrence for parts and contours of different Greebles
[e.g. for a similar statistical approach to object repre-
sentation,see Edelman (1995)].For instance,therewould
be no need to representthe Bogesof a Greeble separately
since they always occurred in redundant pairs (much as
eyes or halves of a face). If expertiseis a result of a large
proportion of cells becoming selectively tuned to multi-
ple parts that frequentlyco-occur, then experts would be
expected to show a cost for the recognition of parts in
isolation or in a Transformed configuration. In accor-
dance with this idea, there is some evidence that
categorization tasks with novel objects can lead to the
creation of new perceptualfeatures, that is, assembliesof
parts that were diagnosticfor the required categorization
judgment (Schyns& Murphy, 1991, 1994).Moreover, in
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the case of both faces and other objects, these temporal
lobe visual “feature detectors” have been found to be
viewpoint-dependent(Logothetis & Pauls, 1995; Miya-
shita & Chang, 1988; Perrett & Oram, 1993). If the
configural cues acquired during expertise are indeed
mediated by associations between and tuning of these
cells, degradationof expert performancewith orientation
changes should be expected, as was found here.
In summary,we hypothesizedthat the putativelyface-
specific sensitivity to configural changes might be
explained by a more general recognition mechanism
fine-tunedby experiencewith homogeneousstimuli.The
present resultswith Greeblesprovidesome evidence that
this is indeed the case-experts showed greater sensitiv-
ity to a change in a studiedGreebleconfigurationthan did
novices. These results suggest that expertise at discrimi-
nating between visually similar objects, such as Greebles
or faces, produces the obtained sensitivity to configural
transformations. More generally, we believe that such
results illuminatethe point thatvisual representationsand
mechanisms are not steady states and, as such, it is
essential to consider how they change with experience.
As Johnsonand Morton(1991)have argued in theirwork
on infants’ face recognition,only a combinationof both
the cognitiveand the biologicalperspectivescan provide
an answer to this fascinating question.
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